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Abstract
Introduction: Reward and stress are important determinants of motivated behaviors. 
Striatal regions play a crucial role in both motivation and hedonic processes. So far, 
little	is	known	on	how	cognitive	effort	interacts	with	stress	to	modulate	reward	pro‐
cesses.	This	study	examines	how	cognitive	effort	(load)	interacts	with	an	unpredict‐
able	acute	stressor	(threat‐of‐shock)	to	modulate	motivational	and	hedonic	processes	
in healthy adults.
Materials and Methods: A	reward	task,	involving	stress	with	unpredictable	mild	elec‐
tric	shocks,	was	conducted	in	23	healthy	adults	aged	20–37	(mean	age:	24.7	±	0.9;	14	
females)	during	functional	magnetic	resonance	imaging	(fMRI).	Manipulation	included	
the	use	of	(a)	monetary	reward	for	reinforcement,	(b)	threat‐of‐shock	as	the	stressor,	
and	 (c)	 a	 spatial	working	memory	 task	with	 two	 levels	 of	 difficulty	 (low	 and	 high	
load)	for	cognitive	load.	Reward‐related	activation	was	investigated	in	a	priori	three	
regions	of	interest,	the	nucleus	accumbens	(NAcc),	caudate	nucleus,	and	putamen.
Results: During	anticipation,	threat‐of‐shock	or	cognitive	load	did	not	affect	striatal	
responsiveness	to	reward.	Anticipated	reward	increased	activation	in	the	ventral	and	
dorsal	striatum.	During	feedback	delivery,	both	threat‐of‐shock	and	cognitive	effort	
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1  | INTRODUC TION
The ability to detect potential rewards and threats in the environ‐
ment	is	fundamental	for	the	survival	of	humans	and	animals	(Haber	
&	Knutson,	2009).	Reward	is	defined	as	the	positive	value	that	one	
ascribes to an object, an action, or an internal physical state, and as 
a	value	that	elicits	approach	behavior	(Schultz,	Dayan,	&	Montague,	
1997;	Wise,	2004).	 In	contrast,	 imminent	threat	stimulates	the	au‐
tonomic nervous system, leading to a “fight‐or‐flight” response to 
escape	 or	 avoid	 the	 aversive	 situation	 (McEwen,	 2007).	 When	 a	
threat persists over time, uncertainty leads to a sustained state of 
vigilance	or	avoidance	(Bali	&	Jaggi,	2015;	Grillon,	2008).	Therefore,	
adaptive goal‐directed behaviors build on the capacity to attribute 
a value to both positive and negative stimuli in order to promote 
approach	toward	rewards	or	avoidance	of	threats	(Balleine,	Delgado,	
&	 Hikosaka,	 2007;	 Fareri	 &	 Tottenham,	 2016).	 Although	 reward‐ 
related approach behaviors and threat‐related defensive responses 
are mainly mediated by subcortical systems, the ability to control 
reactions and actions is modulated by cortical regions involved in 
cognitive	 processes,	 especially	 working	 memory	 (Gilbert	 &	 Fiez,	
2004;	LeDoux	&	Pine,	2016;	Pochon	et	al.,	2002).
Research demonstrates the involvement of a corticostriatal cir‐
cuit	 in	 reward	 processes	 (Fiallos	 et	 al.,	 2017;	 Fuentes‐Claramonte	 
et	al.,	2015;	Liu,	Hairston,	Schrier,	&	Fan,	2011;	Tanaka,	Pan,	Oguchi,	
Taylor,	&	Sakagami,	2015).	 In	particular,	 the	 striatum,	 including	 its	
ventral and dorsal subdivisions, plays a crucial role in detecting 
potential rewards and in modulating consecutive reward‐driven 
behaviors	(Delgado,	2007;	Haber	&	Knutson,	2009).	Part	of	the	ven‐
tral	striatum	(Choi,	Yeo,	&	Buckner,	2012),	 the	nucleus	accumbens	
(NAcc)	is	mainly	engaged	in	affective	valuation	of	positive	and	nega‐
tive incentives, contributing to motivated actions such as avoidance 
or	approach	behaviors	in	both	animals	and	humans	(for	a	review	see:	
Balleine	 &	 Killcross,	 2006;	 Gottfried,	 O'Doherty,	 &	 Dolan,	 2003;	
Pedroni,	Koeneke,	Velickaite,	&	Jäncke,	2011).	To	date,	 the	role	of	
the ventral striatum in reward anticipation has been widely evi‐
denced	both	in	animals	(Ikemoto	&	Panksepp,	1999)	and	in	humans	
(Diekhof,	 Kaps,	 Falkai,	 &	Gruber,	 2012;	 Knutson,	 Adams,	 Fong,	 &	
Hommer,	2001;	Knutson,	Fong,	Adams,	Varner,	&	Hommer,	2001;	
O'Doherty,	 Deichmann,	 Critchley,	 &	 Dolan,	 2002;	 Rademacher,	
Salama,	Gründer,	&	Spreckelmeyer,	2013).	 Its	 implication	has	been	
shown in prediction errors reflecting deviations of received rewards 
from	 expected	 rewards	 (Hare,	 O'Doherty,	 Camerer,	 Schultz,	 &	
Rangel,	2008;	Wittmann	et	al.,	2016),	and	in	the	encoding	and	rep‐
resentation	of	reward	value	and	magnitude	(for	reviews,	see	Bartra,	
McGuire,	&	Kable,	2013;	Diekhof	et	al.,	2012).	With	respect	to	the	
dorsal striatum, the caudate nucleus is implicated in the selection of 
appropriate goal‐directed actions based on the evaluation of action‐
outcome associations, while the putamen governs more automatized 
behaviors	 that	 are	 restricted	 to	 stimulus–response	 associations	
(Grahn,	Parkinson,	&	Owen,	2008).	In	experimental	settings,	reward	
processing is often parsed into its motivational and hedonic subcom‐
ponents	according	to	two	temporal	phases,	 (a)	reward	anticipation	
and	(b)	reward	delivery.	The	former	is	related	to	the	motivation	to	ob‐
tain	a	rewarding	incentive	(i.e.,	a	“wanting”	component),	whereas	the	
latter represents the hedonic state elicited by the reward delivery 
(i.e.,	a	“liking”	component)	(Berridge,	2009;	Berridge	&	Kringelbach,	
2013;	 Berridge,	 Robinson,	 &	 Aldridge,	 2009;	 Luking,	 Pagliaccio,	
Luby,	&	Barch,	2016).	Two	competing	systems	called	model‐based	
and model‐free learning are involved in the control of action selec‐
tion	and	motivated	behaviors	(Lee,	Shimojo,	&	O'Doherty,	2014).	In	
model‐based learning, motivated behaviors result from the evalua‐
tion of contingencies between an instrumental action and its out‐
come	(e.g.,	a	positive	reinforcer	or	a	reward)	and	in	the	computation	
of	action	value	which	promote	goal‐directed	behaviors	 (Balleine	&	
Dickinson,	1998;	Daw,	Niv,	&	Dayan,	2005).	While	 the	emergence	
of goal‐directed behaviors is initiated by model‐based learning, they 
progressively become more habitual and automatized through a 
transition	to	model‐free	 learning,	anchored	in	a	stimulus–response	
modulated	striatal	activation.	Higher	working	memory	load	blunted	NAcc	responsive‐
ness to reward delivery, while stress strengthened caudate nucleus reactivity regard‐
less reinforcement or load.
Conclusions: These findings provide initial evidence that both stress and cognitive 
load	modulate	striatal	responsiveness	during	feedback	delivery	but	not	during	antici‐
pation	in	healthy	adults.	Of	clinical	importance,	sustained	stress	exposure	might	go	
along	with	dysregulated	arousal,	increasing	therefore	the	risk	for	the	development	of	
maladaptive incentive‐triggered motivation. This study brings new insight that might 
help	to	build	a	framework	to	understand	common	stress‐related	disorders,	given	that	
these psychiatric disorders involve disturbances of the reward system, cognitive defi‐
cits, and abnormal stress reactivity.
K E Y W O R D S
anticipation,	delivery,	fMRI,	reward,	stress,	striatum,	working	memory
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mechanism	(Everitt	&	Robbins,	2013).	These	two	learning	processes	
implicate different neural substrates, with goal‐directed behav‐
iors	mainly	governed	by	 the	NAcc	and	 the	caudate	nucleus,	while	
habit	 formation	 is	 essentially	 controlled	 by	 the	 putamen	 (Burton,	
Nakamura,	&	Roesch,	2015;	Everitt	&	Robbins,	2013).
Dysfunctions	in	reward‐seeking	and	goal‐oriented	behaviors	are	
common symptoms of several prevalent psychiatric conditions, such 
as	 addiction	 (Koob,	 Gilpin,	 &	 Boutrel,	 2013;	Martin‐Soelch,	 2013;	
Nikolova	&	Hariri,	 2012),	major	 depression	 (Alloy,	Olino,	 Freed,	&	
Nusslock,	2016),	eating	disorders	(Avena	&	Bocarsly,	2012;	Keating,	
Tilbrook,	 Rossell,	 Enticott,	 &	 Fitzgerald,	 2012),	 or	 schizophrenia	
(Hanssen	et	al.,	2015;	Strauss,	Waltz,	&	Gold,	2014).	For	 instance,	
depressed patients show perturbations in the brain systems in‐
volved in reward valuation and associated approach behaviors, re‐
sulting consequently in a loss of motivation, interest, or pleasure 
for	activities,	which	were	previously	rewarding	(Admon	&	Pizzagalli,	
2015;	Hägele	et	 al.,	 2015;	Martin‐Soelch,	2009).	 In	 turn,	 drug	de‐
pendence is characterized by a decrement in the rewarding effect 
of nondrug rewards coupled with an amplified incentive salience 
of	 cues	 predicting	 drug‐related	 rewards	 (Koob,	 2008,	 2010;	Koob	
et	al.,	2013;	Martin‐Soelch,	2013;	Martin‐Soelch	et	al.,	2001;	T.	E.	
Robinson	 &	 Berridge,	 2000).	 According	 to	 the	 opponent	 process	
theory	(Solomon,	1980),	this	pathological	motivational	process	de‐
velops through the positive hedonic feelings elicited by the drug, 
which result consequently in the positive reinforcement of drug‐
seeking	behaviors.	Following	the	positive	hedonic	effect,	a	counter‐
regulatory homeostatic mechanism comes into play to restore the 
body's	homeostasis	compromised	by	the	overstimulation	produced	
by	 the	 drug	 intake	 (for	 a	 review,	 see	George	&	Koob,	 2010).	 This	
negative process is associated with the recruitment of brain stress 
systems and with the emergence of negative emotional states, which 
are thought to precipitate drug consumption to relieve the negative 
consequences	of	withdrawal	(Martin‐Soelch,	2013).
Converging with the role played by the engagement of brain 
stress systems in pathological motivated behaviors, acute stressors 
are	known	to	alter	both	the	sensitivity	to	reward	(Berghorst,	Bogdan,	
Frank,	&	Pizzagalli,	2013;	Pizzagalli,	Bogdan,	Ratner,	&	Jahn,	2007)	
and	the	core	executive	functions	(for	a	review,	see	Shields,	Sazma,	&	
Yonelinas,	2016),	in	particular	working	memory	(Oei	et	al.,	2016;	Qin,	
Hermans,	van	Marle,	Luo,	&	Fernández,	2009;	Zandara	et	al.,	2016).	
Acute	stressors	are	defined	as	time‐limited	threats	to	an	organism	
(Pacák	&	Palkovits,	2001).	In	experimental	settings,	acute	stressors	
consist	 of	 threats	 lasting	 one	 hour	 or	 less	 (Dickerson	 &	 Kemeny,	
2004),	while	unpredictable	acute	stress	is	known	to	elicit	anxiety	and	
cognitive	deficits	(Bali	&	Jaggi,	2015).	In	turn,	chronic	stressors	refer	
to	sustained	or	repeated	threats	over	one	week	or	more	(Armario,	
2015).	 Brain	 imaging	 data	 revealed	 that	 acute,	 chronic,	 and	 early‐
life	 stress	 exposure	 altered	 neural	 reactivity	 to	 reward	 in	 animals	
(Kleen,	Sitomer,	Killeen,	&	Conrad,	2006;	Lin,	Bruijnzeel,	Schmidt,	&	
Markou,	2002;	Willner,	Moreau,	Nielsen,	Papp,	&	Sluzewska,	1996)	
and	humans	(Berghorst	et	al.,	2013;	Boecker	et	al.,	2014;	Bogdan	&	
Pizzagalli, 2006; Ginty, 2013; Hanson et al., 2015; Porcelli, Lewis, 
Delgado,	Tobler,	&	Schwabe,	2012).	In	humans,	experimental	acute	
stressors,	 such	 as	 threat‐of‐shock	 or	 the	 cold	 pressor	 test,	 were	
found to impair reward‐related neural responses in the ventral stri‐
atum	 during	 both	 reward	 anticipation	 (Choi,	 Padmala,	 Spechler,	 &	
Pessoa,	 2013)	 and	 feedback	 delivery	 (Kumar	 et	 al.,	 2014;	 Porcelli	
et	al.,	2012).	Accordingly,	psychosocial	 stress	 induced	by	 the	Trier	
Social	 Stress	 Test	 (TSST;	 Kirschbaum,	 Pirke,	 &	Hellhammer,	 1993)	
was	shown	to	reduce	reward	responsiveness	to	sexual	stimuli	during	
the	 anticipatory	 phase	 (Oei,	 Both,	 van	Heemst,	&	 van	 der	Grond,	
2014).	 Blunted	 brain	 reactivity	 to	 reward	 under	 stress	 was	 sup‐
ported at the behavioral level, with decreased ability to modulate 
behavior as a function of reinforcement schedule in individuals with 
increased	perceived	stress	in	daily	life	(Pizzagalli	et	al.,	2007).	These	
findings indicating a stress‐induced reduction in reward responsive‐
ness offer a promising neurobiological substrate for understanding 
the development of anhedonic symptoms that are characteristic of 
stress‐related disorders including major depression and addiction for 
instance.	In	contrast,	acute	stress	has	been	also	linked	to	amplified	
incentive‐triggered motivation as evidenced by the enhanced stria‐
tal responses to reward under social stress, in particular during the 
anticipation	of	monetary	reward	(Kumar	et	al.,	2014)	and	of	primary	
rewards	(i.e.,	food;	Pool,	Brosch,	Delplanque,	&	Sander,	2015).	This	is	
in line with the hypothesis that under stressful conditions, rewards 
may be sought for the stress‐reducing capacity associated with their 
consumption	(Berridge	&	Robinson,	1998;	Koob	&	Le	Moal,	2001).	
Taken	 together,	 findings	 remain	 inconsistent	 so	 far	 and	 call	 for	 a	
better understanding of the factors involved in the modulation of 
stress‐related effects on reward responsiveness during both antici‐
patory and delivery processes.
The	 cognitive	 effort	 to	 expend	 for	 obtaining	 the	 reward	 is	 a	
crucial factor that might modulate the effect of stress on motiva‐
tional	and	hedonic	processes,	both	 in	experimental	settings	and	in	
everyday	 life.	 In	daily	 life,	 stressful	contexts	often	accompany	de‐
manding	 tasks,	 requiring	 high	 attentional	 resources.	 To	 achieve	 a	
better understanding of how stress and cognition interact to modu‐
late the reward processes, it is necessary to determine how each of 
these	factors	per	se	influences	motivation	and	hedonic	experience.	
Previous	research	has	focused	on	the	complex	relationship	between	
cognition,	 motivation,	 and	 hedonic	 capacities	 (Akaishi	 &	 Hayden,	
2016;	Esterman	et	al.,	2016;	O'Connor,	Rossiter,	Yücel,	Lubman,	&	
Hester,	2012;	Rothkirch,	Schmack,	Deserno,	Darmohray,	&	Sterzer,	
2014).	 A	 large	 body	 of	 research	 evidenced	 the	 effort‐discounting	
effect	 on	 reward	 valuation,	 so	 that	 the	 effort	 exerted	 to	 obtain	
a	 desired	 reward	 decreases	 as	 effort	 cost	 increases	 (for	 a	 review,	
see	Kurniawan,	2011).	Converging	with	this	hypothesis,	higher	de‐
manding	 tasks	were	 shown	 to	decrease	 the	 activation	 in	 the	ven‐
tral	 (Botvinick,	 Huffstetler,	 &	 McGuire,	 2009;	 Croxson,	 Walton,	
O'Reilly,	Behrens,	&	Rushworth,	2009;	Salamone,	Correa,	Farrar,	&	
Mingote,	2007)	and	dorsal	(Kurniawan	et	al.,	2010)	striatum.	In	turn,	
evidence	 suggests	 that	 executive	 functions,	 and	more	 specifically	
working	 memory	 capacity,	 play	 a	 critical	 role	 in	 motivational	 and	
hedonic	processes	(Yee	&	Braver,	2018).	The	working	memory,	de‐
fined as the capacity for temporarily maintaining and manipulating 
information	(Baddeley,	2010;	Collette	&	Van	der	Linden,	2002),	is	a	
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particularly relevant cognitive function to investigate because of its 
broad implications in learning, reasoning, valuating, planning goal‐
directed	 behavior,	 and	 regulating	 adaptively	 emotions	 (Collette	 &	
Van	der	Linden,	2002;	Etkin,	Buechel,	&	Gross,	2015;	Gilbert	&	Fiez,	
2004;	Pochon	et	al.,	2002).	Of	particular	 importance,	acute	stress	
was shown to selectively diminish the contributions of model‐based 
learning strategies to behaviors through increased activation of 
the	hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal	 (HPA)	axis	 (Otto,	Raio,	Chiang,	
Phelps,	&	Daw,	2013).	Specifically,	it	was	evidenced	that	acute	stress	
exposure	might	impair	prefrontal	cortex	functioning	notably	by	in‐
creasing dopaminergic release, resulting therefore in enhanced ha‐
bitual	and	automatic	behaviors	at	 the	expense	of	 flexible	adaptive	
behaviors	 (for	 a	 review,	 see	Arnsten,	2009).	The	ability	 to	engage	
model‐based learning strategies requires cognitive resources to en‐
able	the	implementation	of	controlled	goal‐directed	behaviors	(Otto,	
Gershman,	Markman,	&	Daw,	2013).	A	promising	hypothesis	linking	
stress sensitivity to motivated behaviors suggests that higher‐order 
cognitive functions might modulate the stress‐induced effect on 
the capacity to engage in goal‐directed actions. Converging with 
this idea, a study demonstrated that the detrimental effect of acute 
stress on the ability to engage model‐based strategies to guide be‐
haviors	was	modulated	by	individual	working	memory	capacity,	with	
higher	working	memory	capacity	protecting	against	stress‐induced	
reduction	in	model‐based	learning	(Otto,	Raio,	et	al.,	2013).
So	 far,	 researchers	 have	 taken	 an	 active	 interest	 in	 investigat‐
ing	(a)	the	role	of	stress	on	reward	responsiveness	(Berghorst	et	al.,	
2013;	Boecker	et	al.,	2014;	Bogdan	&	Pizzagalli,	2006;	Ginty,	2013;	
Hanson	et	al.,	2015;	Porcelli	et	al.,	2012),	(b)	the	relationship	between	
cognition	and	motivation	(Botvinick	et	al.,	2009;	Satterthwaite	et	al.,	
2012;	Vassena	et	al.,	2014),	 and	 (c)	 the	effect	of	 stress	on	higher‐
order	 cognitive	 functions	 (for	 a	 review,	 see	Arnsten,	 2009).	Here,	
we	used	an	event‐related	fMRI	task	to	test	how	unpredictable	acute	
stressor	 (threat‐of‐shock)	modulates	 reward	 responsiveness	 under	
variable	levels	of	cognitive	effort	(working	memory	load)	exerted	for	
obtaining	a	monetary	 reward.	Based	on	previous	 research,	we	hy‐
pothesized that the unpredictable acute stressor would increase stri‐
atal reactivity to cued reward during anticipation and would reduce 
striatal	reactivity	to	reward	during	feedback	delivery.	According	to	
the	effort‐discounting	effect,	we	expected	that	high	working	mem‐
ory load would counteract the enhancing effect of stress on striatal 
reactivity to reward anticipation, but would strengthen the blunting 
effect	of	stress	on	the	striatal	reactivity	to	reward	delivery.	At	the	
behavioral level, we hypothesized that both the unpredictable acute 
stressor and the higher cognitive load would reduce performance 
(as	 reflected	by	a	slower	reaction	times	and	a	decreased	response	
accuracy),	thus	acting	synergistically.
2  | MATERIAL S AND METHODS
2.1 | Participants
Twenty‐three	 healthy,	 right‐handed	 adults	 (14	 women,	 mean	
age:	 24.7	 ±	 0.9,	 aged	 20–37	 years)	 participated	 in	 this	 study.	
Socioeconomic status was average relative to the Swiss popula‐
tion	according	to	the	index	for	individual	socioeconomic	level	(IPSE;	
Genoud,	 2011)	 (mean	 IPSE:	 57.9	 ±	 3.4).	 Participants	 reported	 no	
current or past psychopathology, as well as no use of psychoac‐
tive	drugs,	 as	assessed	by	 the	Mini‐International	Neuropsychiatric	
Interview	(M.I.N.I.;	Sheehan	et	al.,	1998).	In	addition,	no	history	of	
neurological or endocrine diseases was present among the sample.
2.2 | General procedure
This	study	was	approved	by	the	local	ethical	review	boards	of	Vaud	
and	 Fribourg	 region	 (Commission	 cantonale	 d'éthique	 de	 la	 re‐
cherche	sur	 l'être	humain	[CER‐VD],	study	number	261/14)	as	well	
as	of	Bern	region	(Kantonale	Ethikkommission	Bern	[KEK	BE],	study	
number	337/14)	and	all	participants	provided	written	informed	con‐
sent.	Before	entering	the	scanner,	the	participants	were	trained	on	
the	task.	During	the	fMRI	scanning	session,	participants	completed	
two	blocks	of	the	Fribourg	reward	task,	one	without	(control	condi‐
tion)	and	one	with	the	experimentally	induced	acute	stressor	(stress	
condition).
2.3 | Fribourg reward task
This	 event‐related	 fMRI	 task	was	 adapted	 from	 the	 reward	 task	
developed	by	Martin‐Soelch	et	al.	(2009)	to	elicit	brain	responses	
to	 reward	anticipation	and	delivery.	At	 the	onset	of	each	 trial,	 a	
visual	cue	(1,500	ms)	was	presented	informing	participants	of	the	
effort	level	of	working	memory	to	expend	(low,	high)	and	the	mon‐
etary	reward	associated	with	performance	(“blank	screen”	for	not‐
rewarded	trials	or	“$$”	for	rewarded	trials).	After	the	presentation	
of	 a	 fixation	 cross	 (500	ms),	 participants	 saw	an	 array	of	 yellow	
circles	 (3	or	7	circles,	1,500	ms).	A	fixation	cross	 (3,000	ms)	was	
presented	 before	 the	 visual	 target	 (1,500	ms).	 The	 visual	 target	
(a	 green	 circle)	was	 displayed	 at	 any	 position	 on	 the	 screen	 and	
signaled	that	the	participant	should	decide	as	quickly	as	possible	
whether this circle was at the same position as one of the circles 
presented	previously.	After	response	execution	and	a	variable	jit‐
tered	interstimulus	interval	(ISI;	0	ms	or	2,000	ms),	the	feedback	
screen	 (1,000	 ms)	 informed	 the	 win	 (“blank	 screen”	 for	 not‐re‐
warded	trials;	“1	CHF”	for	rewarded	trials)	and	was	followed	by	a	
last	screen	(1,000	ms)	indicating	the	cumulated	amount	of	earned	
money	 (rewarded	 trials)	 or	 a	 blank	 screen	 (not‐rewarded	 trials).	
Every four trials, participants rated their mood and stress levels 
for	a	maximal	duration	of	20	s.	Correct	responses	were	associated	
with	monetary	gains	 (1	CHF)	 in	 the	 rewarded	condition.	Correct	
responses	 were	 not	 associated	 with	 monetary	 gains	 (0	 CHF)	 in	
the	not‐rewarded	condition.	All	 functional	 images	were	acquired	
within	two	distinct	blocks.	In	the	first	one	(i.e.,	control	condition),	
no	stressor	was	included	during	the	task.	 In	the	second	one	(i.e.,	
stress	 condition),	 a	moderate	 stress	was	 introduced	 through	 the	
administration	 of	 six	 unpredictable	 mild	 electric	 shocks	 to	 in‐
vestigate	 its	 impact	 on	 reward	 responsiveness.	 In	 this	 task,	 the	
cognitive	 effort	 to	 expend	 was	 modulated	 with	 two	 levels	 of	
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working	memory	load	(low	and	high)	corresponding	to	the	number	
of circles to be remembered. Participants were informed that they 
would receive the total sum in cash at the end of the scanning ses‐
sion. Figure 1 details the timing of the events of a rewarded and a 
not‐rewarded trial.
2.4 | Acute experimental stress manipulation
Participants	were	told	that	they	may	receive	electrical	shocks	at	
any	 time	 during	 the	 second	 block	 of	 the	 experimental	 task	 (i.e.,	
stress	 condition),	 while	 they	 were	 informed	 that	 no	 electrical	
shocks	would	be	delivered	during	the	first	block.	Six	unpredictable	
mild	 electric	 shocks	were	 delivered	 during	 the	 stress	 condition.	
Shocks	were	given	on	 the	external	 side	of	 the	nondominant	 left	
hand	of	participants	via	6‐mm	Ag/AgCl	electrodes,	using	the	SHK	
module	 of	 the	Psychlab	 system	 (Contact	 Precision	 Instruments).	
The	electrode	wires	were	connected	to	a	nonferromagnetic	shock	
box	placed	on	a	table	just	beside	the	scanner.	Before	entering	the	
scanner,	 a	 standard	 shock	workup	 procedure	was	 conducted	 to	
determine	individual	shock	intensity	(M	=	1.07	mA	±	0.09),	starting	
at the lowest level and increasing the intensity until the partici‐
pant	identified	an	“aversive,	but	not	painful”	feeling	(Robinson	et	
al.,	2011).	Highest	allowable	intensity	level	of	the	shock	was	5	mA	
(milliamperes).
2.5 | Self‐reported ratings of the experimental 
stressor manipulation
Every	four	trials	of	the	event‐related	Fribourg	reward	task,	self‐re‐
ported ratings of mood and stress were assessed at the end of the 
trial	using	a	Visual	Analog	Mood	Scale	(scaled	from	0	to	9)	adapted	
from	Nyenhuis,	Stern,	Yamamoto,	Luchetta,	and	Arruda	(1997).	For	
each participant, self‐reported ratings were averaged separately 
during the control condition and the stress condition and were en‐
tered	into	SPSS	(Version	25.0;	IBM	SPSS	Statistics).
2.6 | MR data acquisition
Magnetic	resonance	imagery	(MRI)	acquisition	was	performed	at	the	
Department of Diagnostic and Interventional Neuroradiology of the 
University	Hospital	of	Bern,	Switzerland.	The	functional	MRI	images	
were acquired using a Siemens TrioTim syngo 3.0‐Tesla whole‐body 
scanner	equipped	with	a	32‐channel	head	coil.	MRI	acquisition	 in‐
cluded	3D	T1‐weighted	(Magnetization	Prepared	Rapid	Acquisition	
Gradient	Echo;	MPRAGE)	images	with	the	following	settings:	sagit‐
tal	slices:	176;	FOV:	256	mm	×	256	mm;	matrix	size:	256	×	256;	voxel	
size:	1.0	×	1.0	×	1.0	mm3; TR: 2,300 ms; TE: 2.32 ms; flip angle: 8°. 
During	 the	event‐related	 task‐based	 fMRI,	 an	echo‐planar	 imaging	
(EPI)	pulse	sequence	was	used	with	following	settings:	 interleaved	
ascending	slices:	38;	FOV:	192	×	192	mm;	matrix	size:	64	×	64;	voxel	
size:	3.0	×	3.0	×	4.0	mm3; TR: 2,000 ms; TE: 30 ms; flip angle: 90°. 
The	event‐related	task‐based	fMRI	included	two	blocks	within	one	
scanning	session.	Each	block	lasted	on	average	20	min.	Stimuli	were	
presented	via	goggles	(VisualStimDigital	MR‐compatible	video	gog‐
gles;	Resonance	Technology	Inc.)	with	a	visual	angle	of	60°,	a	resolu‐
tion	of	800	×	600	pixels,	and	60	Hz	refresh	rate.	The	task	was	run	
using	E‐Prime	(version	2.0.10.353;	Psychology	Software	Tools,	Inc.).	
Total	time	in	the	scanner	was	approximately	60	min.
2.7 | Analyses of working memory performance
A	2	×	2	×	2	repeated‐measures	ANOVA	with	Reward	(rewarded,	not‐
rewarded)	×	Stress	(stress,	control)	×	Load	(low,	high)	as	within‐sub‐
ject	factors	was	run	using	SPSS	(version	25.0;	IBM	SPSS	Statistics)	
on	 reaction	 times	and	 response	accuracy	on	 the	working	memory	
task.
F I G U R E  1   Illustration	of	(a)	a	not‐
rewarded trial at the highest level of 
working	memory	(WM)	load	and	(b)	a	
rewarded	trial	at	the	easiest	WM	load	of	
the	Fribourg	reward	task
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2.8 | Analyses of the acute experimental stressor 
effect on self‐reported ratings
The	effect	of	acute	experimental	stressor	manipulation	on	self‐re‐
ported measurements of stress and mood was tested by comput‐
ing the difference between self‐reported ratings during the control 
condition	and	the	stress	condition.	A	Wilcoxon	signed‐rank	test	was	
applied	using	SPSS	(version	25.0;	 IBM	SPSS	Statistics).	A	nonpara‐
metric test was used because of the non‐normally distributed mood 
ratings and two outliers among the stress ratings.
2.9 | fMRI data analysis
2.9.1 | fMRI data preprocessing
All	images	were	processed	using	Analysis	of	Functional	NeuroImages	
(AFNI;	Cox,	1996).	Subjects	with	gross	motion	exceeding	3	mm	were	
excluded	from	further	analysis	(averaged	motion:	0.05	±	0.01).	The	
EPI images were preprocessed according to the following steps 
using afni_proc.py.	Motion	parameters	 from	each	block	were	used	
as separate regressors and did not differ significantly between the 
control	condition	(mean	TR	censored:	0.45%)	and	the	stress	condi‐
tion	(mean	TR	censored:	0.47%),	t(22)	=	−0.09,	p > .05. To correct for 
motion, any EPI volume with an Euclidean mean of 0.3 mm shift from 
its preceding volume was censored from regression along with its 
preceding	volume.	Subject‐level	exclusion	for	motion	was	based	on	
the	0.3	mm	censoring.	In	addition,	TRs	with	more	than	10%	of	(mo‐
tion‐based)	voxel	outliers	were	censored.	Subjects	with	more	than	
10%	 censored	 TRs	 were	 excluded	 from	 analysis.	 Three	 subjects	
were	excluded	based	on	these	criteria,	 leaving	a	sample	of	n = 23. 
T1	images	were	first	processed	with	FreeSurfer	version	6.0.0	(Fischl,	
2004)	 to	 obtain	 segmentation	 masks	 corresponding	 to	 the	 skull‐
stripped	 brain,	 white	 matter,	 and	 ventricles.	 Whole‐brain	 masks	
were	warped	with	standard	normalization	to	Montreal	Neurological	
Institute	 (MNI)	 space	using	 the	 ICBM	2009a	Nonlinear	Symmetric	
atlas	(Fonov,	Evans,	McKinstry,	Almli,	&	Collins,	2009),	and	spatially	
smoothed	with	an	isotropic	6	mm	full‐width	half	maximum	Gaussian	
kernel.	 Binary	masks	were	 averaged	 and	 thresholded	 at	 0.95	 (i.e.,	
95%	overlap)	to	create	a	group‐level	gray	matter	mask	(Torrisi	et	al.,	
2018).
2.9.2 | fMRI data analysis
Statistical	analysis	was	performed	within	the	framework	of	the	gen‐
eral	linear	model,	as	implemented	in	the	AFNI	program	3dDeconvolve. 
Analyses	focused	on	changes	in	BOLD	contrast	that	occurred	during	
reward	anticipation	and	feedback	delivery.	To	determine	the	effects	
of	 monetary	 reward,	 experimental	 stressor,	 and	 working	 memory	
load	on	BOLD	responses,	a	general	linear	model	was	performed	with	
stress	 (stress	vs.	 control),	 reward	 (rewarded	vs.	 not‐rewarded),	 and	
load	(high	vs.	low)	as	fixed	factors,	and	subjects	as	a	random	factor.	To	
test a priori hypotheses focusing on the interaction effect between 
stress	 and	 working	 memory	 load	 on	 striatal	 sensitivity	 to	 reward	
during	 reward	 anticipation	 and	 feedback	 delivery,	 three	 regions	 of	
interest	 (ROIs)	 were	 created	 using	 the	 maximum	 probability	 atlas	
of	Desai	DKD	maps	 in	FreeSurfer	 (Desikan	et	al.,	2006;	Destrieux,	
Fischl,	Dale,	&	Halgren,	2010;	Fischl,	2004).	ROIs	included	the	bilat‐
eral	NAcc,	caudate	nucleus,	and	putamen.	Activation	of	voxels	(i.e.,	
parameter	 estimates)	 was	 averaged	 and	 extracted	 from	 each	 ROI	
mask	 in	 each	 condition	 and	 in	 each	 subject.	Next,	 parameter	 esti‐
mates	extracted	from	each	ROI	were	entered	and	analyzed	into	SPSS.	
A	2	×	2	×	2	repeated‐measures	ANOVA	with	reward	(rewarded,	not‐
rewarded)	×	stress	(stress,	control)	×	load	(low,	high)	as	within‐subject	
factors was calculated for testing our hypotheses on striatal ROIs. 
Parameter	estimates	extracted	from	each	ROI	were	normally	distrib‐
uted and satisfied the homogeneity of variance assumption. ROI acti‐
vation analyses were corrected for multiple comparisons by applying 
a	 Bonferroni	 correction	 (p‐value	 =	 0.05/3	 =	 .017).	 A	 whole‐brain	
2	×	2	×	2	repeated‐measures	ANOVA	was	also	conducted.	To	address	
the	 concerns	 of	 inflated	 false‐positive	 rates	 identified	 by	 Eklund,	
Nichols,	and	Knutsson	(2016),	whole‐brain	activation	maps	were	cor‐
rected for multiple comparisons by using a cluster‐based approach by 
conducting	10,000	Monte	Carlo	simulations	using	the	AFNI	program	
3dClustSim, after smoothness of noise in the dataset itself and from 
the residuals had been estimated for each subject and then averaged 
over all subjects with 3dFWHMx. The updated 3dClustSim version 
includes	a	mixed	autocorrelation	function	(ACF)	that	better	models	
non‐Gaussian	noise	structure	(Cox,	Chen,	Glen,	Reynolds,	&	Taylor,	
2017).	 fMRI	data	were	 then	 thresholded	using	a	voxelwise	p‐value 
threshold of p < .001, and a minimum cluster size of k = 18, which cor‐
responds to a whole‐brain, cluster‐level alpha of p < .05.
3  | RESULTS
3.1 | Effect of acute experimental stressor on self‐
reported ratings
We first assessed whether self‐reported stress and negative mood 
ratings	 increased	 in	 the	 stress	 condition.	 A	Wilcoxon	 signed‐rank	
test showed a significant increase in self‐reported stress in the stress 
condition	 (Mdn	=	2.0;	 IR	=	2.2)	compared	to	the	control	condition	
(Mdn	=	1.7;	 IR	=	2.4),	Z	 =	−2.35,	p ≤  .02. In addition, a significant 
decrease in the subjective mood ratings was induced by the stress 
condition	 (Mdn	=	7.2;	 IR	=	3.4)	compared	 to	 the	control	condition	
(Mdn = 7.8; IR =	3.8),	Z	=	−2.05,	p ≤ .04	(Figure	2).
3.2 | Working memory performance
3.2.1 | Response accuracy
As	predicted,	the	repeated‐measures	ANOVA	on	the	response	accu‐
racy revealed a main effect of reward with significant increased re‐
sponse	accuracy	in	rewarded	trials	(M	=	83.1%;	SE	=	1.4%)	compared	
to	not‐rewarded	trials	(M	=	79.2%;	SE	=	2.2%),	F1,22 = 9.2, p ≤ .006, 
η2	=	0.29.	In	accordance	with	our	expectation,	a	main	effect	of	work‐
ing memory load showed a significant decreased response accuracy 
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in	 trials	 under	 high	working	memory	 load	 (M	 =	 74.3%;	SE	 =	 2.1%)	
compared	 to	 low	 working	 memory	 load	 (M	 =	 88.0%;	 SE	 =	 1.8%),	
F1,22 = 55.0, p < .001, η
2	 =	 0.71.	 Unexpectedly,	 a	 main	 effect	 of	
stress appeared with increased response accuracy in the stress con‐
dition	 (M	 =	 84.7%;	 SE	 =	 1.8%)	 compared	 to	 the	 control	 condition	
(M	=	77.7%;	SE	=	2.1%),	F(1,22)	= 13.4, p ≤ .0.001, η
2	=	0.38	(Figure	3).
3.2.2 | Reaction times (RT)
Corroborating	our	expectation,	the	repeated‐measures	ANOVA	on	
the	reaction	times	showed	a	significant	main	effect	of	working	mem‐
ory load indicating slower reaction times in trials under high load 
(M = 825.0 ms; SE	=	18.1	ms)	compared	to	low	load	(M = 742.1 ms; 
SE	=	19.0	ms),	F1,22 = 75.1, p < .001, η
2 = 0.77. The stress condition led 
to	significant	faster	responses	(M = 754.1 ms; SE	=	21.4	ms)	in	com‐
parison	with	reaction	times	in	the	control	condition	(M = 813.0 ms; 
SE	=	17.0	ms),	F1,22 = 16.9, p < .001, η
2 = 0.43. The effect of reward 
did	not	significantly	affect	reaction	times	(Figure	3).
3.3 | fMRI results
3.3.1 | ROI analysis: Striatal activations during 
reward anticipation
The anticipation of potential monetary rewards induced a signifi‐
cant	main	 effect	 of	 reward	with	 increased	 activation	 in	 the	NAcc	
(F1,22 = 9.60, p	≤	.006,	η
2	=	0.30,	Bonferroni‐corrected),	caudate	nu‐
cleus	 (F1,22 = 12.51, p	≤	 .002,	Bonferroni‐corrected),	and	putamen	
(F1,22 = 9.11, η
2 = 0.29, p	≤	.007,	Bonferroni‐corrected)	in	rewarded	
trials	 compared	 to	 not‐rewarded	 trials.	 Both	 threat‐of‐shock	 and	
level	of	working	memory	load	did	not	show	any	significant	effect	on	
the	neural	correlates	of	reward	anticipation	(Figure	4).	Main	and	in‐
teraction	effects	in	each	condition	from	each	ROI	mask	are	detailed	
in	the	appendix	(Table	A1).
3.3.2 | ROI analysis: Striatal activations during 
feedback delivery
During	 feedback	 delivery,	 a	 main	 effect	 of	 stress	 was	 present	 in	
the caudate nucleus with higher activation in the stress condition 
compared	to	the	control	condition	(F1,22 = 6.81, p	≤	.016,	η
2 = 0.24, 
Bonferroni‐corrected).	Additionally,	a	significant	reward	by	working	
memory	load	interaction	occurred	in	the	NAcc	(F1,22 = 7.76, p	≤	.011,	
η2	=	0.26,	Bonferroni‐corrected).	Post	hoc	analysis	indicated	that	the	
NAcc	responses	to	reward	delivery	depended	on	the	level	of	work‐
ing memory load, with greater responsiveness to reward delivery in 
low	working	memory	load	compared	to	high	working	memory	load	
(t22 = 3.85, p	<	.001,	Bonferroni‐corrected;	Figure	5).	Main	and	inter‐
action	effects	in	each	condition	from	each	ROI	mask	are	detailed	in	
the	appendix	(Table	A1).
Significant whole‐brain clusters in contrasts discussed above 
are	presented	in	Table	1	(whole‐brain	corrected	using	a	cluster‐level	
alpha of p	<	.05;	see	Tables	A2	and	A3	in	the	appendix	for	a	compre‐
hensive	report	of	whole‐brain	activations	in	all	conditions).
F I G U R E  2   Effect of the stress condition on subjective stress 
and	mood	ratings	during	the	Fribourg	reward	task.	(a)	Median	and	
min./max.	scores	characterizing	self‐reported	stress	in	the	control	
and stress conditions, scaled from 0 “not stressed at all” to 9 “very 
stressed.”	(b)	Median	and	min./max.	scores	characterizing	self‐
reported mood in the control and stress conditions, scaled from 0 
“very negative mood” to 9 “very positive mood.” *p < .05
F I G U R E  3  Working	memory	(WM)	performance	during	the	Fribourg	reward	task.	(a)	Averaged	reaction	times	in	the	control	versus	stress	
conditions	according	to	low	and	high	WM	load.	(b)	Averaged	response	accuracy	in	the	control	versus	stress	conditions	according	to	low	and	
high	WM	load.	(c)	Averaged	response	accuracy	in	rewarded	and	not‐rewarded	trials.	**p < .01, ***p < .001
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4  | DISCUSSION
The aim of the current study was to investigate the effects of an acute 
stressor	induced	experimentally	by	threat‐of‐shock	and	of	cognitive	
effort	(high	vs.	low	working	memory	load)	on	the	striatal	responsive‐
ness	 to	monetary	 reward,	during	reward	anticipation	and	feedback	
notification.	To	the	best	of	our	knowledge,	this	is	the	first	study	spe‐
cifically	 exploring	 how	 stress	 induction	 and	working	memory	 load	
modulate neural reactivity to reward during the anticipation and de‐
livery	phases.	Consistent	with	prior	fMRI	studies,	stress	manipulation	
successfully induced a negative mood and increased self‐reported 
stress	in	participants	(Bogdan	&	Pizzagalli,	2006;	Grillon,	Ameli,	Foot,	
&	Davis,	1993).	Contrary	to	our	expectations,	no	significant	interac‐
tion occurred among stress, cognitive load, and reward during the an‐
ticipation of potential monetary rewards. Enhanced striatal reactivity 
to potential reward occurred in rewarded trials, irrespective of the 
modulation	by	 the	experimental	 stressor	or	by	 the	cognitive	effort	
to	expend	 for	 getting	 the	 reward.	Crucially,	 both	 stress	 and	cogni‐
tive	effort	affected	striatal	activation	during	feedback	delivery,	but	
these factors did not interact to modulate reward responsiveness. 
First, striatal reactivity to reward delivery was modulated by the level 
of	working	memory	effort	that	was	expended	to	obtain	the	reward,	
with significantly decreased responsiveness to monetary reward in 
the ventral striatum following high, compared to low, cognitive effort. 
Second, stress strengthened reactivity in the dorsal striatum during 
feedback	delivery	and	enhanced	cognitive	performance.
The present study indicates that both ventral and dorsal striatum 
responded to potential monetary reward during the cue‐triggered 
anticipation	irrespective	of	the	presence	of	an	experimental	stressor	
or of the level of cognitive effort engaged for obtaining the reward. 
These findings converge with previous data demonstrating increased 
activation in striatal regions in response to anticipated monetary re‐
wards	(Knutson	&	Greer,	2008;	Miller,	Shankar,	Knutson,	&	McClure,	
2014;	 Rademacher	 et	 al.,	 2013).	 Significant	 increase	 in	 striatal	 re‐
sponsiveness to anticipated rewards in our study was additionally 
consistent with enhanced behavioral performance in rewarded trials, 
compared to not‐rewarded trials. Collectively, our results showed 
that potential reward improved response accuracy and decreased re‐
action times. These behavioral results are in accordance with findings 
pointing out that reward was able to increase cognitive performance 
(Choi,	 Padmala,	 &	 Pessoa,	 2015;	 Savine,	 Beck,	 Edwards,	 Chiew,	 &	
Braver,	2010),	as	evidenced,	for	instance,	in	a	spatial	working	mem‐
ory	 task	 (Kennerley	&	Wallis,	 2009).	 Increased	 striatal	 responsive‐
ness to anticipated reward and improved behavioral performance 
might reveal enhanced incentive‐triggered motivation. In contrast to 
our	hypotheses	and	recent	studies	 indicating	that	stress	 (Kumar	et	
al.,	2014)	and	greater	cognitive	demands	 (Vassena	et	al.,	2014)	 led	
to higher involvement of the neural circuits underlying motivated 
F I G U R E  4   Illustration	of	the	main	effect	of	reward	during	the	anticipation	phase.	Significant	main	effect	of	reward	(rewarded	vs.	
not‐rewarded)	in	the	bilateral	(a)	nucleus	accumbens,	(b)	caudate	nucleus,	and	(c)	putamen.	Parameter	estimates	(βeta	weights)	mean	
with standard errors are presented at the top of the figure. Statistical parametric maps corresponding to the contrasts of interest during 
anticipation	are	presented	below.	Whole‐brain	activations	are	corrected	for	multiple	comparisons	using	a	voxelwise	p‐value threshold 
of p < .001, and a minimum cluster size of k = 18, which corresponds to a whole‐brain, cluster‐level alpha of p	<	.05.	A	voxelwise	p‐value 
threshold of p < .05 was used here for visualization purpose. **p < .01
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behaviors,	no	effect	of	the	experimental	stressor	together	with	the	
level of cognitive load modulated the neural reactivity to reward.
During	feedback	delivery,	the	striatal	responsiveness	to	reward	
delivery was modulated by the level of cognitive effort deployed 
for obtaining the reward. Specifically, reward responsiveness in the 
ventral striatum decreased following high, compared to low, cogni‐
tive effort. Our findings converge with mounting evidence demon‐
strating	 that	 a	 higher	 amount	 of	 both	 physical	 (e.g.,	 Apps,	 Grima,	
Manohar,	&	Husain,	2015;	Bonnelle	et	 al.,	 2015;	Kurniawan	et	 al.,	
2010)	and	cognitive	(e.g.,	Botvinick	et	al.,	2009;	Krigolson,	Hassall,	
Satel,	&	Klein,	2015;	Stoppel	et	al.,	2011)	efforts	diminish	the	value	
attached	to	a	reward.	Also,	data	showing	decreased	NAcc	respon‐
siveness	 during	 reward	 delivery	 following	 the	 exertion	 of	 higher	
cognitive	 effort	 support	 directly	 the	 present	 results	 (Botvinick	 
et	al.,	2009).	In	line	with	the	idea	that	the	value	attributed	to	a	po‐
tential reward is inversely related to the degree of effort required 
for	obtaining	it	(Botvinick	et	al.,	2009),	our	findings	suggest	that	the	
magnitude	of	cognitive	effort	exerted	had	a	discounting	effect	on	re‐
ward value, reflected by decreased striatal responsiveness to reward 
delivery. While dopaminergic neurotransmission has been strongly 
involved	 in	 the	willingness	 and	 in	 the	 ability	 to	 expend	 higher	 ef‐
fort	for	getting	a	reward	(Boehler	et	al.,	2011;	Treadway	et	al.,	2012;	
Wardle,	Treadway,	Mayo,	Zald,	&	de	Wit,	2011),	a	possible	hypoth‐
esis	explaining	the	effort‐discounting	effect	which	occurred	during	
reward	delivery	 is	that	effort	expenditure	might	have	engaged	the	
same	dopaminergic	corticolimbic	brain	network	as	the	one	involved	
during the attribution of reward value, both competing for the same 
cognitive	resources	(Stoppel	et	al.,	2011;	Vassena	et	al.,	2014).
Interestingly,	 the	 acute	 experimental	 stressor	 strengthened	
activation	 in	 the	 caudate	 nucleus	 during	 feedback	 delivery,	 
irrespective of the level of cognitive effort or of the presence of 
incentive. Increased threat‐related recruitment of the caudate nu‐
cleus might be due to heightened arousal mediated by increased 
dopamine release in the striatum, as previously suggested in the 
NAcc	 (Cabib	 &	 Puglisi‐Allegra,	 2012;	 Pruessner,	 Champagne,	
Meaney,	 &	 Dagher,	 2004;	 Soares‐Cunha,	 Coimbra,	 Sousa,	 &	
Rodrigues,	2016).	In	humans,	enhanced	dopamine	signaling	in	the	
striatum	has	been	linked	with	the	arousing	effect	of	novel	or	alert‐
ing	cues	(Horvitz,	2002;	Soares‐Cunha	et	al.,	2016)	and	with	the	
attentional	 capture	 by	 salient	 cues	 (Anderson,	 2017).	 Together	
F I G U R E  5  Statistical	parametric	maps	during	feedback	delivery	showing	(a)	a	main	effect	of	stress	in	the	bilateral	caudate	nucleus	
with	significant	increased	activation	in	the	stress	condition	compared	to	the	control	condition.	(b)	Reward	by	working	memory	(WM)	load	
interaction	in	the	nucleus	accumbens,	with	significant	decreased	responsiveness	to	reward	delivery	under	high	compared	to	low	WM	load.	
Whole‐brain	activations	are	corrected	for	multiple	comparisons	using	a	voxelwise	p‐value threshold of p < .001, and a minimum cluster 
size of k = 18, which corresponds to a whole‐brain, cluster‐level alpha of p	<	.05.	A	voxelwise	p‐value threshold of p < .05 was used here for 
visualization purpose. *p < .05, ***p < .001
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with the caudate nucleus, the superior frontal regions, the supe‐
rior parietal lobule, and the anterior insula also showed increased 
threat‐related activation. This finding is in line with a recent study 
evidencing enhanced recruitment of the caudate nucleus, the an‐
terior	 insula,	and	regions	of	the	frontoparietal	attention	network	
under	threat‐of‐shock	(Torrisi	et	al.,	2016).	In	particular,	stronger	
Activated clusters in 
brain regions Side
MNI coordinates (LPI)
Cluster size T‐Valuex y z
1.	Anticipation
Main	effect	of	reward:	rewarded	>	not‐rewarded	trials
Lateral occipital L −47 −86 −11 456 4.32
Fusiform R 50 −65 −20 297 5.56
Superior parietal L −8 −80 53 70 4.03
Lateral occipital R 38 −92 14 61 4.11
Superior parietal R 29 −59 68 34 4.13
Supramarginal L −53 −38 56 31 4.45
Superior parietal R 32 −41 50 30 4.63
Rostral middle 
frontal
L −41 50 2 27 4.60
Superior parietal L −20 −83 41 27 4.75
Lingual R 8 −83 −17 25 3.84
Cerebral white 
matter
L −20 −71 8 24 4.89
Superior parietal R 23 −83 50 21 5.68
2.	Feedback	delivery
Main	effect	of	stress:	stress	>	control	conditions
Superior parietal R 20 −92 38 42 5.11
Superior frontal L −2 11 38 31 4.69
Lateral occipital R 17 −101 20 28 4.72
Insula L −38 −23 5 22 5.00
PCC R 11 −26 41 20 5.11
Caudate R 17 8 17 18 3.97
Postcentral L −56 −26 47 18 3.99
Interaction	effect	Reward	×	WM	load:	rewarded	>	not‐rewarded	trials	in	the	low	load	
condition
Lateral occipital L −47 −86 −11 1,867 4.95
Superior frontal L −2 62 2 247 4.36
Superior parietal L −32 −65 56 126 3.98
PCC R 2 −29 32 78 4.80
Superior temporal L −62 −35 5 74 8.13
Inferior parietal R 44 −59 59 47 3.88
Precentral L −47 5 38 41 4.00
Superior parietal R 44 −47 56 41 4.38
Insula R 32 14 −20 26 4.08
Superior frontal L −2 38 23 26 4.18
Cerebellum L −29 −74 −47 24 4.46
Note: Whole‐brain activations presented for every specific contrast are corrected for multiple 
comparisons	using	a	cluster‐based	approach	with	a	voxelwise	p‐value threshold of p < .001 and 
a minimum cluster size of k = 18, which corresponds to a cluster‐level alpha of p < .05. LPI means 
that x increases from left to right, y increases from posterior to anterior, z increases from inferior to 
superior.
Abbreviations:	L,	left;	R,	right.
TA B L E  1   Significant whole‐brain 
clusters	(cluster	size	corrected)	for	(a)	
the	main	effect	of	reward	(rewarded	vs.	
not‐rewarded)	during	the	anticipation	
phase,	and	(b)	the	main	effect	of	stress	
(stress	vs.	control),	as	well	as	interaction	
effect	between	reward	(rewarded	vs.	
not‐rewarded)	and	working	memory	(WM)	
load	(high	vs.	low)	during	the	feedback	
delivery phase
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recruitment	 of	 superior	 frontal	 regions	 during	 stress	 exposure	
in	 our	 task	 converge	with	 data	 showing	 that	 acute	 stress	 expo‐
sure might strengthen cognitive arousal mediated possibly by 
increased dopaminergic neurotransmission in prefrontal regions, 
resulting	 in	higher	working	memory	performance	(Arnsten	&	Jin,	
2014;	Weerda,	Muehlhan,	Wolf,	&	Thiel,	 2010).	Accordingly,	 en‐
hanced threat‐related activation in prefrontal and parietal regions 
was paralleled by improved cognitive performance under threat‐
of‐shock	in	our	study.	Indeed,	stress	elicited	higher	response	accu‐
racy and faster reaction times. Since our study did not manipulate 
dopamine pharmacologically, interpretations on the potential 
involvement of the dopamine system should be considered with 
caution. Nevertheless, these findings converge with behavioral 
data	in	animals	(Yuen	et	al.,	2011)	and	humans	(Duncko	&	Johnson,	
2009;	Torrisi	et	al.,	2016),	showing	threat‐related	enhanced	work‐
ing	memory	performance	(Duncko	&	Johnson,	2009).	Altogether,	
the	 present	 findings	 suggest	 that	 unpredictable	 stress	 exposure	
might contribute to the dysregulation of cognitive and emotional 
arousal, resulting consequently in a sensitization of the dorsal stri‐
atum	 reactivity	 to	 outcomes	 generally.	 Also,	 the	 present	 results	
indicate that the ability to encode reward value is modulated by 
effort	expenditure,	with	a	propensity	to	depreciate	reward	value	
following high‐demanding cognitive effort.
This study comes with some limitations deserving mention. 
First,	 given	 our	 within‐subjects	 design	 and	 that	 both	 blocks	 with	
and	without	stressor	took	place	on	the	same	day,	no	randomization	
was	possible	between	blocks,	in	order	to	avoid	the	potential	bleed‐
ing	of	negative	effects	 induced	by	threat‐of‐shock	into	the	control	
condition. However, this methodology permits to avoid the method‐
ological issues of scanning in different days. Second, although stress 
manipulation successfully induced negative affect and strengthened 
self‐reported stress, no physiological data are supporting the effec‐
tiveness of the stress manipulation. Third, the potential temporal 
autocorrelation of first‐level imaging data is a limitation that should 
be	taken	into	account.	A	final	limitation	is	that	the	sample	size	was	
relatively small, and thus, the results should be considered prelimi‐
nary, in need of replication.
In conclusion, the present study provides initial evidence that 
both acute stressor and cognitive load modulate neural respon‐
siveness	during	feedback	delivery	but	not	during	the	anticipation	
of potential monetary reward. Our results indicate that reward 
value decreases under demanding cognitive load. High cognitive 
effort might represent a cost, which decreases the value of the 
reward, and shifts attention away from the reward. Of particu‐
lar	relevance,	threat‐of‐shock	facilitates	behavioral	performance,	
probably by increasing arousal and attentional focus through the 
recruitment of striatal regions and areas involved in the fronto‐
parietal	 attention	 network	 (Balderston	 et	 al.,	 2017;	 McEwen	 &	
Sapolsky,	1995;	Torrisi	et	al.,	2016).	In	line	with	a	recent	meta‐ana‐
lytic study showing striatal hyperactivation during reward notifica‐
tion	in	individuals	with	substance	addiction	(Luijten,	Schellekens,	
Kühn,	Machielse,	&	Sescousse,	2017),	these	findings	extend	pre‐
vious	work	by	suggesting	that	sustained	stress	exposure	might	go	
along with dysregulated arousal, resulting possibly in increased 
risk	 for	 the	development	of	maladaptive	 incentive‐triggered	mo‐
tivation. In sum, this study brings new insight that might help to 
build	a	framework	to	understand	common	stress‐related	disorders	
involving disturbances of the reward system, cognitive deficits, 
and abnormal stress reactivity.
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TA B L E  A 2  Significant	whole‐brain	clusters	(cluster	size	corrected)	for	the	main	effects	of	stress,	reward,	and	working	memory	(WM)	
load, as well as their interactions during the anticipation phase
Activated clusters in 
brain regions Side
MNI coordinates (LPI)
Cluster size T‐Valuex y z
Main	effect	of	reward:	rewarded	>	not‐rewarded	trials
Lateral occipital L −47 −86 −11 456 4.32
Fusiform R 50 −65 −20 297 5.56
Superior parietal L −8 −80 53 70 4.03
Lateral occipital R 38 −92 14 61 4.11
Superior parietal R 29 −59 68 34 4.13
Supramarginal L −53 −38 56 31 4.45
Superior parietal R 32 −41 50 30 4.63
Rostral middle 
frontal
L −41 50 2 27 4.60
Superior parietal L −20 −83 41 27 4.75
Lingual R 8 −83 −17 25 3.84
Cerebral white 
matter
L −20 −71 8 24 4.89
Superior parietal R 23 −83 50 21 5.68
Main	effect	of	WM	
load: high > low 
loads
      
Lingual L −1 −85 0 1675 7.83
Interaction	effect:	Reward	×	Stress
Rewarded > not‐rewarded trials in the control condition
Inferior 
temporal
L −50 −62 −20 203 3.81
Lateral occipital R 44 −77 −17 126 5.01
Superior 
parietal
L −8 −77 53 120 4.32
Lateral occipital L −29 −98 14 62 5.42
Superior 
parietal
R 23 −80 50 33 3.93
Lateral occipital R 32 −95 20 21 4.27
Rostral middle 
frontal
L −35 53 −2 20 4.42
Superior 
parietal
L −35 −62 53 18 5.11
Rewarded > not‐rewarded trials in the stress condition
Lateral occipital L −47 −86 −11 210 4.96
Cerebellum R 50 −71 −26 25 4.03
Lateral occipital R 53 −74 −8 22 4.35
Parietal 
occipital
L −17 −71 11 18 4.05
Postcentral R 35 −35 47 18 4.29
Interaction	effect:	Reward	×	WM	load
Rewarded > not‐rewarded trials in the low load condition
Lateral occipital L −44 −86 −11 227 6.14
Fusiform R 50 −65 −20 152 4.12
(Continues)
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Activated clusters in 
brain regions Side
MNI coordinates (LPI)
Cluster size T‐Valuex y z
Lateral occipital R 38 −92 14 64 4.33
Inferior parietal L −32 −77 29 29 4.50
Superior 
parietal
L −44 −47 56 21 3.80
Sulcus parieto‐
occipital
L −20 −71 11 18 4.38
Superior 
parietal
L −23 −65 53 18 4.96
Rewarded > not‐rewarded trials in the high load condition
Fusiform L −47 −62 −20 211 4.40
Lateral occipital R 50 −77 −14 61 5.62
Superior 
parietal
L −29 −68 53 30 4.41
Lingual R 2 −80 −5 27 4.50
Lateral occipital L −29 −98 14 18 4.20
Interaction	effect:	Stress	×	WM	load
High > low loads in the control condition
Lingual R 20 −77 −14 1,214 6.20
High > low loads in the stress condition
Cerebellum R 20 −80 −14 856 7.05
Interaction	effect:	Reward	×	Stress	×WM	load
Rewarded > not‐rewarded trials in the low load and control conditions
Lateral occipital L −41 −83 −14 34 4.16
Inferior parietal L −38 −92 14 30 3.99
Fusiform R 47 −65 −20 20 4.20
Rewarded > not‐rewarded trials in the high load and control conditions
Fusiform L −43 −67 −15 99 4.61
Lateral occipital R 46 −74 −14 24 4.16
Superior 
parietal
L −13 −73 48 24 5.12
Lateral occipital L −31 −93 15 21 5.02
Rewarded > not‐rewarded trials in the low load and stress conditions
Lateral occipital L −47 −86 −11 63 3.84
Lateral occipital L −26 −98 14 45 4.23
Lateral occipital R 38 −77 −11 25 4.52
Supramarginal L −50 −32 50 21 4.41
Rewarded > not‐rewarded trials in the high load and stress conditions
Lateral occipital L −50 −83 −5 36 5.15
Fusiform L −35 −59 −17 25 4.66
Fusiform L −35 −74 −17 17 4.29
Cerebellum L −11 −68 −17 17 7.71
Note: Whole‐brain activations presented for every specific contrast are corrected for multiple comparisons using a cluster‐based approach with a 
voxelwise	p‐value threshold of p < .001 and a minimum cluster size of k = 18, which corresponds to a cluster‐level alpha of p < .05. LPI means that x 
increases from left to right, y increases from posterior to anterior, z increases from inferior to superior.
Abbreviations:	L,	left;	R,	right.
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TA B L E  A 3  Significant	whole‐brain	clusters	(cluster	size	corrected)	for	the	main	effects	of	stress,	reward,	and	working	memory	(WM)	
load,	as	well	as	their	interactions	during	the	feedback	delivery	phase
Activated clusters in 
brain regions Side
MNI coordinates (LPI)
Cluster size T‐Valuex y z
Main	effect	of	reward:	rewarded	>	not‐rewarded	trials
Lateral occipital L −47 −86 −11 2,859 5.38
Rostral	ACC R 2 47 8 626 6.57
Superior parietal R 35 −68 59 157 4.30
Lateral 
orbitofrontal
R 47 26 −17 78 5.58
Middle	temporal L −65 −38 5 72 5.37
Superior parietal L −29 −68 44 72 4.62
Superior temporal L −50 23 −11 52 4.10
Cerebellum L −5 −56 −35 48 5.70
Rostral middle 
frontal
R 50 44 23 41 4.65
Thalamus L −2 −2 8 28 3.82
Precuneus L −11 −62 8 28 3.97
Precentral L −50 8 38 28 5.17
Lateral occipital L −11 −104 14 26 −5.40
Supramarginal R 65 −29 35 22 −3.83
Ventral	DC L −2 −14 −14 20 5.80
Rostral middle 
frontal
L −50 38 20 18 5.51
Main	effect	of	stress:	stress	>	control	conditions
Superior parietal R 20 −92 38 42 5.11
Superior frontal L −2 11 38 31 4.69
Lateral occipital R 17 −101 20 28 4.72
Insula L −38 −23 5 22 5.00
PCC R 11 −26 41 20 5.11
Caudate R 17 8 17 18 3.97
Postcentral L −56 −26 47 18 3.99
Main	effect	of	WM	load:	high	>	low	loads
Amygdala L −17 −2 −17 29 −4.24
Superior frontal L −2 68 −2 18 −4.18
Interaction	effect:	Reward	×	Stress
Rewarded > not‐rewarded trials in the control condition
Lateral occipital L −47 −86 −11 991 5.32
Lateral occipital R 44 −89 −11 863 7.83
Superior frontal R 2 53 2 379 7.15
Middle	
temporal
L −59 −56 14 149 4.52
PCC L −2 −29 32 147 5.84
Hippocampus L −23 −20 −14 121 3.97
Ventral	DC R 20 −26 −8 83 5.36
Pars orbitalis R 50 26 −14 52 4.06
Thalamus L −2 −2 8 38 4.30
(Continues)
20 of 21  |     GAILLARD et AL.
Activated clusters in 
brain regions Side
MNI coordinates (LPI)
Cluster size T‐Valuex y z
Superior 
temporal
L −47 23 −17 34 3.94
Cerebellum R 2 −83 −38 28 3.95
Precuneus R 8 −56 8 25 5.32
Inferior parietal R 47 −50 56 21 4.74
Superior frontal R 2 32 32 18 4.40
Rewarded > not‐rewarded trials in the stress condition
Lateral occipital L −47 −86 −11 735 4.96
Lateral occipital R 50 −68 −20 709 4.11
Superior frontal R 2 50 11 243 5.99
Superior 
parietal
R 35 −65 59 82 4.15
PCC R 2 −29 32 79 6.03
Superior 
parietal
L −29 −68 47 72 5.89
Cerebellum R 2 −83 −38 51 5.10
Cerebellum L −11 −56 −35 31 4.17
Inferior parietal R 32 −74 41 25 3.83
Precentral L −47 5 38 22 3.81
Rostral middle 
central
R 50 44 23 20 4.12
Interaction	effect:	Reward	×	Load
Rewarded > not‐rewarded trials in the low load condition
Lateral occipital L −47 −86 −11 1867 4.95
Superior frontal L −2 62 2 247 4.36
Superior 
parietal
L −32 −65 56 126 3.98
PCC R 2 −29 32 78 4.80
Superior 
temporal
L −62 −35 5 74 8.13
Inferior parietal R 44 −59 59 47 3.88
Precentral L −47 5 38 41 4.00
Superior 
parietal
R 44 −47 56 41 4.38
Insula R 32 14 −20 26 4.08
Superior frontal L −2 38 23 26 4.18
Cerebellum L −29 −74 −47 24 4.46
Rewarded > not‐rewarded trials in the high load condition
Lateral occipital L −47 −86 −11 927 5.58
Lateral occipital R 50 −68 −20 656 4.14
Rostral	ACC R 2 47 8 384 5.39
Isthmus 
cingulate
R 11 −53 5 110 4.57
Ventral	DC R 17 −29 −8 55 4.98
PCC L −2 −29 32 42 5.02
Cerebellum R 2 −83 −38 30 4.52
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Activated clusters in 
brain regions Side
MNI coordinates (LPI)
Cluster size T‐Valuex y z
Cerebellum L −5 −56 −35 26 5.21
Lateral 
orbitofrontal
R 47 23 −17 25 4.14
Rostral middle 
frontal
R 50 44 23 17 4.16
Interaction	effect:	Stress	×	WM	load
High > low loads in the control condition
Superior 
parietal
R 38 −47 65 27 −3.90
High > low loads in the stress condition
Superior frontal L −2 62 −2 50 −4.49
Amygdala L −17 −2 −17 31 −5.60
Hippocampus R 23 −14 −14 19 −5.82
Interaction	effect:	Reward	×	Stress	×WM	load
Rewarded > not‐rewarded trials in the low load and control conditions
Lateral occipital L −47 −86 −11 794 4.82
Lateral occipital R 44 −89 −11 674 6.39
Superior frontal R 2 53 2 129 5.75
Superior 
temporal
L −62 −35 5 74 6.21
Insula L −29 17 −8 27 4.09
Note: Whole‐brain activations presented for every specific contrast are corrected for multiple comparisons using a cluster‐based approach with a 
voxelwise	p‐value threshold of p < .001 and a minimum cluster size of k = 18, which corresponds to a cluster‐level alpha of p < .05. LPI means that x 
increases from left to right, y increases from posterior to anterior, z increases from inferior to superior.
Abbreviations:	L,	left;	R,	right.
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